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Abstract 
In this article, we explain how secrecy influenced the communication and decision-making processes 
within COINTELPRO–Black Nationalist Hate Groups, the FBI’s covert program to disrupt left-leaning 
Black political organizations between 1967 and 1971. Memos exchanged between the FBI Director 
and field offices reveal how the organization strategized to conceal its identity as the source of anon-
ymous communication. The Bureau developed explicit techniques for managing the content of their 
messages, the materials used to construct print messages, and the distribution of those messages. The 
Bureau’s techniques suggest that organizational secrecy involves a high degree of coordination be-
tween members, but it may also endanger the organization’s longevity and the public welfare. 
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Secrecy is often met with suspicion and distrust. Because secrecy involves intentional con-
cealment (Bok, 1983), sometimes including one’s identity, it has been a source of conflict 
over power (Mobley, 2012), trust (Anand & Rosen, 2008), and national security (Priest & 
Arkin, 2011), all of which suggest political conspiracy, corruption, or repression. Julian 
Assange, the driving force behind the Internet site WikiLeaks, recently highlighted se-
crecy’s liabilities when he leaked a quarter of a million U.S. classified diplomatic cables in 
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November 2010. From his perspective, “the state’s secrets can never be anything but its 
crimes; having secrets is already proof of criminal and immoral political activities” (Horn, 
2011, p. 119). 
The controversy surrounding WikiLeaks highlights ongoing public disagreement about 
the function of government-held secrets for American democracy. The 1997 Commission 
on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy (popularly known as the Moynihan Com-
mission) surveyed the long history of U.S. government secrecy and reported that more than 
400,000 new secrets are created annually at the highest level. In 1994, it was estimated that 
the U.S. government had more than 1.5 billion pages of classified materials that were at 
least 25 years old (Moynihan, 1997). Recognizing the sheer number of classified secrets and 
covert operations, we explore how covert organizations actually maintain their secrecy. 
Many government agencies, notably the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and FBI, often 
operate in secretive, clandestine, and covert ways. Scott (2013) observes that covert opera-
tions are those conducted to hide the identity of the sponsoring organization, whereas 
clandestine refers to concealment of the operations themselves (p. 13). This study examines 
both the covert and clandestine efforts of one particular organization tasked with the job of 
protecting national security: the FBI. In particular, we analyze the FBI’s internal commu-
nication regarding COINTELPRO–Black National Hate Groups, a counterintelligence pro-
gram that sought to disrupt left-wing Black political organizations between 1967 and 1971. 
The entire COINTELPRO program itself was a closely guarded FBI secret because the pro-
gram’s mission was illegal. Secret memos exchanged between FBI agents involved with 
this program foregrounded strategies to keep their activities hidden from other federal 
offices, targeted organizations, and the public. 
In the following section we review the literature on organizational secrecy. Then, we 
provide a brief history of COINTELPRO, explain our method, and describe our findings. 
We explain how the goal of concealing their operations structured the FBI’s written com-
munication. This goal led agents to strategize methods for hiding the identities of agents 
as sources of anonymous messages. Thus, agents developed specific and precise tech-
niques for preparing and distributing their messages. We conclude with a discussion of 
the practical and ethical implications of secrecy for organizations that rely on it to avoid 
accountability for their actions. 
 
Literature Review 
 
Organizational Secrecy 
Defined at its most fundamental level, secrecy involves “the intentional withholding of 
information from specific individuals” (Anand & Rosen, 2008, p. 97). Although this defi-
nition appears straightforward, decades of research on secrecy indicate the contrary. The 
foundation of secrecy theory was laid in the first two decades of the 20th century when 
two German sociologists, Georg Simmel (1858–1918) and Max Weber (1864–1920), responded 
to the changes and implications of the industrial institution. Weber (1946/1958) understood 
secrecy as a creation of and tool for bureaucracy. For Weber, secrecy was essentially a “util-
itarian concept having to do with keeping the means of administration secret from those 
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who are administered” (Blank, 2009, p. 60). Simmel (1906), in contrast, focused on the im-
pact that secrets played on the relations between individuals and their community. He 
argued that secrecy formed the basis for all relationships in society; secrecy itself “is the 
structure of human interaction” (p. 462). These two distinct approaches to secrecy have 
guided recent research on secrecy at the personal (Bok, 1983; Goodall, 2006) and institu-
tional levels (Colella, Paetzold, Zandkoohi, & Wesson, 2007; Costas & Grey, 2014; Gibson, 
2014; Grey, 2014). 
Much of the current literature on organizational and governmental secrecy takes a We-
berian viewpoint to address issues surrounding secret documents created by the U.S. gov-
ernment, and to assess the difficulties of acquiring access to those materials (Amer, 2009; 
Dempsey, 2009; Grey, 2014). Most of these studies theorize secrecy from an informational 
perspective in which secrecy is imperative to protect valuable information. Costas and 
Grey (2014) complicate this assumption by arguing that the social nature of secrecy in or-
ganizations is equally important. Their sociological theorization of secrecy as a social process 
implicitly highlights the communicative dimensions of secrecy. By examining organiza-
tional secrecy from an informational perspective and as a social process, features of secrecy 
become foregrounded, including power structures, labor, ethical consciousness, and ano-
nymity. 
One major feature of secrecy involves the protection and establishment of power struc-
tures. As Bok (1983) observes, secrecy inherently presupposes a separation between the 
keepers of the secret and those who are excluded. The social inclusions and exclusions 
created by practices of secrecy are bound by structures of control whereby secrets, or “prized 
possessions” (Black, 1988), allow individuals to control other people. Conversely, secrets 
require quite a bit of self-control from the role of the secret keeper. Secret holders, such as 
the “power elite” (Mills, 1959), occupy a position of power in that “by withholding knowledge, 
they are able to shape a particular construction of reality” (Keane, 2008, p. 109). As we 
suggest below, such secrets may or may not be accurate. The revelation of secrets, both 
true and false, can lead to disillusionment and loss of trust. 
Although organizational secrecy poses several potential problems, the actual practice of 
secrecy requires sustained physical, emotional, and communicative labor. Liebeskind 
(1997) notes that keeping organizational secrets is both a difficult and costly endeavor due 
to the compensation given to employees as a way to encourage them to keep secrets, the 
structural isolation of geographic separation, and restrictions that go into protecting or-
ganizational knowledge. The emotional and intellectual efforts of secret keeping are an 
additional burden. Lane and Wegner (1995) argue that secret keeping is a performance that 
requires not only “stringent behavioral proscriptions [to] ensure that the performer is on 
edge whenever there is the potential for disclosure,” but also careful repair work when 
something slips or a secret is revealed (p. 237). The work of framing messages about secrets 
requires additional effort to the already labor-intensive process. Dark side activities, such 
as secrecy, are often “communicatively masked to make the illegitimate appear legitimate, 
dissensus appear to be consensus and to facilitate exploitation” (Linstead, Maréchal, & 
Griffin, 2014, p. 171). Mobley (2012) adds that no group can actually achieve perfect secrecy 
while functioning effectively and that every adaptation or new advantage attained by 
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groups also produces new vulnerabilities. Thus, the work that goes into creating and main-
taining boundaries of secrecy is strenuous. 
In addition to posing practical challenges, scholarship has noted unique ethical chal-
lenges for organizations that use secrecy to achieve their goals (Anand & Rosen, 2008), for 
organizations that go to great lengths to hide their identity, and for our own responsibili-
ties—as consumers and citizens—to potentially reveal secrets (Scott, 2013). Exposing or-
ganizational secrets can place people, especially employees, in an ethical conundrum 
because organizational members are often required to report unethical acts, but breaking 
the secrecy around the act itself may border on the unethical or even illegal (Miceli & Near, 
1992). 
Our analysis of the FBI’s COINTELPRO memos is particularly concerned with the prac-
tical and ethical challenges facing organizations that endeavor to hide their activities 
through the use of anonymous communication. Anonymity is partly based on the degree 
to which a message source is unknown (Anonymous, 1998). Hidden organizations conceal 
their identity through organizational practices according to the degree to which people 
know about the message source. This can come in the form of complete anonymity or 
through partial anonymity, such as through the use of pseudonyms, or fictitious alterna-
tive identities (Scott, 2013). Rains and Scott (2007) observe that the success of an organiza-
tion’s attempt at secrecy often hinges on whether recipients view anonymous messages 
favorably and the extent to which they believe they can identify the sender. Recipients are 
more likely to evaluate the organization positively if they cannot and do not wish to iden-
tify the source. 
In this article, we highlight the communication strategies that the FBI used to keep 
COINTELPRO activities hidden from individuals outside of the Bureau. Stohl and Stohl 
(2011) argue that the distinctive communicative foundations of hidden organizations pose 
some of the greatest organizational and theoretical challenges and opportunities. Scott 
(2013) challenges scholars to unmask the organizational processes associated with hidden 
organizations. By drawing on the institutional viewpoint of secrecy and by approaching 
secrecy as a social process, this study focuses on how one hidden organization maintained 
secrecy. 
 
History of the FBI’s COINTELPRO 
Between 1956 and 1971, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover initiated a series of counterintelli-
gence programs referred to as COINTELPROs to undermine dissident movements be-
lieved to pose a threat to the security of the United States. FBI agents throughout the 
country engaged in a series of covert and illegal actions to circumvent Supreme Court rul-
ings that protected the rights of dissidents. In one of these rulings, the Supreme Court re-
interpreted the Smith Act1 to conclude that speech advocating the violent overthrow of the 
government was protected unless that rhetoric led to violent conduct (Theoharis, 2004). 
Because the Bureau could not arrest law-abiding political organizations, the FBI sought to 
disrupt organizing efforts by spreading distrust and factionalism among members of tar-
geted organizations, discouraging nonmembers from supporting activist efforts, and pre-
venting movements from accessing resources. 
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In the decades immediately following the passage of The Smith Act, Hoover deliber-
ately kept the Bureau’s counter-subversive activities secret from Congress, the Department 
of Justice, and others outside of the FBI because counterintelligence operations violated 
civil liberties. Hiding these actions served the FBI in a variety of ways. First, it enabled 
Hoover to maintain his position as FBI Director. If knowledge of COINTELPRO became 
known to the Bureau’s critics, Hoover’s own credibility would have been badly damaged. 
Second, Hoover believed that the Bureau’s success hinged on maintaining a strong public 
image. Public knowledge of the Palmer Raids had generated negative public perceptions 
of the FBI, and much of Hoover’s work as the Director involved cultivating relationships 
with the media. Finally, engaging in covert actions gave the agency insularity and auton-
omy. Technically, Hoover reported to the Department of Justice and the Attorney General. 
Keeping actions hidden from these offices enabled the Bureau to efficiently undermine 
dissident movements that had not broken the law without openly violating prosecutorial 
rules. 
Hoover instituted the first COINTELPRO targeting the Communist Party–USA on Au-
gust 28, 1956. Over the course of 15 years, Hoover expanded COINTELPRO programs to 
target six additional movements including the Socialist Workers Party, Puerto Rican na-
tionalists, the Ku Klux Klan, various civil rights and Black power organizations (which 
they referred to as Black Nationalist Hate Groups), the New Left, and the American Indian 
Movement. Hoover routinely asserted that surveillance of all dissident movements was 
necessary to prevent the spread of communism. 
Hoover initiated the COINTELPRO–Black Nationalist Hate Group (BNHG) program in 
1967. He directed field agents to identify imaginative actions designed to “expose, disrupt, 
misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize the activities” of Black activist organizations 
(Director to All Offices, August 25, 1967). This program targeted a variety of civil rights 
and Black Power organizations with different and sometimes competing ideologies, in-
cluding the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference (SCLC), Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), Deacons for De-
fense and Justice, Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), Nation of Islam (NOI), US Organi-
zation, and the Black Panther Party (BPP). These groups were not selected on the basis of 
their violent behavior but for their potential for provoking violence within the Black com-
munity. However, this perceived threat was based on concerns about the rhetoric of the 
Black left, not on evidence of planned attempts to engage in violence or overthrow the 
government. 
Part of Hoover’s motivation for targeting Black dissident movements was to prevent 
“the rise of a Messiah . . . who could unify, and electrify, the militant black nationalist 
movement” (Director to Sullivan, February 29, 1968). Visible public figures including Mar-
tin Luther King, H. Rap Brown, and Stokely Carmichael were targets of extensive counter-
intelligence activity. In the fall of 1968, Hoover focused the Bureau’s attention on the BPP. 
Due to their rapid growth and revolutionary rhetoric, Hoover told New York Times readers 
that the Panthers were the “greatest threat to the internal security of the country” (Book 
III, 1976, p. 188). Between 1967 and 1971, the FBI had launched 295 counterintelligence 
operations against Black activists under the COINTELPRO–BNHG program; 233 of them 
were directed toward the Panthers (Self, 2006, p. 45). 
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The program ended in 1971 after a group of activists calling themselves the Citizens’ 
Commission to Investigate the FBI broke into FBI offices in Media, Pennsylvania, and bur-
glarized the Bureau’s files. The full extent of COINTELPRO was revealed after the Justice 
Department responded to a Freedom of Information Act request and released the memos 
to the public in 1977. In 1976, a Senate report concluded that the Bureau’s “lawless tactics” 
used in COINTELPRO operations fomented “violence and unrest” (Self, 2006, p. 45). U.S. 
district Judge Thomas Griesa ruled against the FBI in a lawsuit filed by the Socialist Work-
ers Party and Young Socialist Alliance, finding that the Bureau’s operations were “patently 
unconstitutional” (Blackstock, 1988, p. 8). Despite its engagement in illegal activities, COIN-
TELPRO continued for 15 years because there was virtually no external oversight of the 
Bureau’s conduct. Hoover kept extensive files about the immoral or illegal behavior of 
many political figures, including congressional leaders, attorneys general, and presidents 
(Theoharis, 1991). These files quite possibly enabled the FBI to avoid scrutiny from public 
officials (Cunningham, 2003). 
The COINTELPRO era of the FBI provides a unique opportunity for understanding the 
internal communication of hidden organizations. COINTELPRO operated before the amended 
Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts of 1974. Thus, FBI agents could presume that 
none of their written communication would be shared outside the Bureau. Furthermore, 
FBI procedures for handling and circulating internal memos were designed to hide illegal 
surveillance and counterintelligence tactics from Congress and the Department of Justice. 
Typically, FBI offices filed and indexed all of their internal written communication; how-
ever, memos referencing illegal actions were routed to the FBI director’s office or the office 
of a designated FBI assistant director. To prevent individuals outside of the agency from 
discovering these actions, Hoover ordered his assistant directors and supervisors to de-
stroy these files on a regular basis. Public exposure of COINTELPRO is due in large part 
to directors’ and supervisors’ failure to fully comply with this order (Theoharis, 2004). 
Prior to their discovery, agents had no reason to use “Bureau ‘code’ to conceal the true 
nature of activities” and thus were “free” to write candidly in their memos (Cunningham, 
2004, p. 39). Of course, agents were not entirely unfettered in their language choices; cer-
tainly, a desire to maintain in good standing with Hoover and the Bureau influenced their 
writing. However, the internal memos exchanged between FBI agents offers an expanded 
glimpse into the communication practices engaged by members of hidden organizations 
when they thought no one else was looking. 
The FBI’s written internal memos reveal detailed organizational processes designed to 
keep COINTELPRO hidden. Although the identities of FBI agents were a matter of public 
record, the agency strategized to conceal their efforts from others. The Bureau’s primary 
strategy was to create and deliver anonymous messages to members of targeted organiza-
tions, public officials, and local communities in which organizations were active. Given 
that the program lasted for more than five years undetected, they were largely successful. 
To gain further understanding about the organizational processes involved in maintaining 
COINTELPRO’s covert status, we ask, what communication strategies did the FBI use to 
hide the identities of FBI agents as the source of these messages? 
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Method 
 
Because Hoover required that each field office disrupt local activist communities within 
their jurisdictions, Special Agents in Charge (SACs) of each field office were expected to 
submit proposals to the national office for approval. Field offices could not move forward 
until Hoover or one of his assistant directors provided written consent. Consequently, 
Hoover’s office exchanged copious memos with SACs each week. These memos have been 
a valuable resource in understanding the cultural and political implications of the FBI’s 
language and strategies (Cunningham & Browning, 2004; Drabble, 2004, 2007, 2008) and 
in theorizing repressive techniques used against target organizations (Cunningham, 2003). 
Extending this work, we analyzed the memos to identify the ways in which the agents 
strategized to conceal their role in creating and distributing deceptive messages. 
 
Data Sources 
In 1977, 50,000 pages of COINTELPRO memos were released to the public and collected 
on microfilm by Scholarly Resources, Inc. We reviewed memos organized within the 
BNHG file, and analyzed those memos from that file that describe explicit counterintelli-
gence activities proposed by SACs in various field offices or recommended by the national 
office. We excluded memos that solely provided intelligence information about Black ac-
tivist activity. In total, we analyzed more than 1,300 pages of BNHG files written between 
1967 and 1971. All files consisted of internal correspondence between the Director, J. Edgar 
Hoover; the Bureau’s Domestic Intelligence Division head, William Sullivan; and SACs 
within the different field offices across the United States. These files also include news 
articles about targeted organizations and samples of materials designed by field agents for 
distribution to targeted individuals and organizations. 
Our sample is limited by a couple of factors. The memos collected by Scholarly Re-
sources, Inc. may not represent the complete collection of memos exchanged by the Bureau 
during the COINTELPRO era. As Theoharis (2004) notes, Hoover ordered field officers to 
regularly destroy counterintelligence files. Furthermore, Cunningham (2004) observes that 
the total number of quarterly reports filed in 1968 represent only 65% of the estimated total 
had each field office actually filed reports as requested (p. 294). Another limitation is that 
the FBI redacted the names of informants and particular targets from the files. Cunning-
ham (2004) observes that the FBI’s censoring is inconsistent, and events are usually dis-
cussed in a sequence of memos, so it is sometimes possible to identify the redacted 
information (p. 38). Finally, although our empirical analysis focuses on internal communi-
cation texts, we do not have access to the informal communication between agents. With-
out this informal communication, we cannot know how agents discussed secrecy beyond 
the Director’s watch. Written information is inherently more vulnerable to exposure, and 
agents might have refrained from writing particularly sensitive or incriminating details. 
Despite these limitations, the files provided us with the rare opportunity to examine how 
members of an organization strategized to maintain their secrets. 
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Data Analysis 
Analyzing the internal communication of an organization through their texts is a fruitful 
research method that allows researchers to examine language-in-use (Saldaña, 2013). Stra-
tegic internal communication provides a valuable framework for examining the inner 
workings of organizing (Men, 2014). Acknowledging that this study would focus on or-
ganizational secrecy, we used the constant comparative method (Charmaz, 2009) as a way 
to map the strategies associated with upholding organizational secrecy. 
To begin our analysis, we each read a small sampling of the same memos to acquaint 
ourselves with the material and to discuss general observations, themes, and patterns 
within the files. We developed and refined a working schema and an eclectic set of codes 
according to the contents of the sample (Saldaña, 2013). We noticed that the focus of much 
of the content of the memos revolved around concealing the FBI’s identity as the message 
source. Based on this observation, we identified all of the memos that referenced the Di-
rector’s decision to approve or deny proposals on the basis of their ability to maintain the 
FBI’s covert status. We then identified the strategies and techniques that agents and the 
Director recommended to hide their identities as message sources. Each author individually 
coded approximately 600 pages of memos. From our coding, we identified an overarching 
strategy and typology of techniques. The consistent discussions and checks between the 
two authors throughout the process provided more meticulous attention to the language 
and deeper reflection on the emergent patterns and meanings within these files. 
In the following analysis, we explain the strategies the FBI used to hide their identities 
as sources of communication designed to disrupt and discredit their targets. The memos 
reveal that hiding COINTELPRO operations was an energy-intensive objective that in-
volved a systematic concern for the content and distribution of messages. Space constraints 
prevent us from recounting all the examples within the memos that illustrate these typol-
ogies. Instead, we identify typologies that agents proposed or carried out and provide rep-
resentative examples of each type of action to offer a snapshot of the correspondence 
within the COINTELPRO–BNHG files. 
 
Findings 
 
An analysis of the COINTELPRO memos provides insight into the organization’s strate-
gies and techniques to keep the program’s existence and informants hidden from its targets 
and the general public. SAC proposals routinely provided detailed explanations of how 
proposed communication should not be traced back to the FBI. Concomitantly, the Direc-
tor’s decision to deny or approve requests frequently hinged on whether he believed that 
the actions could be conducted covertly. The regularity of the memos’ references to the 
covert status of their actions indicates that secrecy was an important criterion—if not the 
most important criterion—for evaluating proposed actions. The Director frequently re-
jected proposals if he believed that they had potential to expose the FBI’s efforts to disrupt 
lawful political organizing.2 
Director-approved strategies principally revolved around the creation and circulation 
of anonymous print and telephone messages. A brief discussion of the Director’s reasons 
for rejecting specific proposals illuminates his preference for anonymous communication. 
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Because the Bureau relied upon informants to gather intelligence about leftist political or-
ganizations, the Director sought to avoid exposing the identities of informants to individ-
uals outside of the Bureau. In a memo denying San Diego’s request to use an informant to 
spread a rumor among members of US Organization, a cultural Black nationalist group, 
the Director explained that “the initiation of . . . a rumor by the informant could come to 
the attention of local authorities who could undoubtedly pursue such information. Subse-
quent investigation could result in the rumor being traced to the informant” (Director to 
San Diego, March 2, 1970). 
Agents were also discouraged from using third parties to distribute information that 
might expose the FBI’s efforts. The Director even considered establishing FBI connections 
with the post office as a risk. The Boston field office requested permission to rent a post 
office box under a pseudonym to receive mail responding to one of their counterfeit news-
letters. The Director requested more information, warning agents that, “in this type of op-
eration, it is desirable that not even the Postal Inspectors be aware of the identity of the 
Post Office box lessee” (Director to Boston, May 9, 1969). 
Rather than personally deliver information or go through third parties, agents’ strate-
gies routinely involved the creation and circulation of anonymous print and telephone 
messages. After denying a request to use informants or third parties, the Director usually 
recommended this line of action. For example, the Director asserted that Mobile agents 
could disparage the reputation of the BPP “through an anonymous telephone call to the 
pastor of the church thereby eliminating the necessity of involving a ghetto informant in 
counterintelligence matters” (Director to Mobile, January 6, 1971.) 
Most of the Bureau’s anonymous messages took the form of letters, leaflets, and phone 
calls that were then sent to individuals who participated in or supported activists’ efforts. 
Agents also anonymously circulated publicly available print material, such as newspaper 
columns, that critiqued targeted organizations. Message patterns across the memos, as 
well as previous historical research, highlight how the organization managed its internal 
and external communication to keep the source of COINTELPRO messages a secret. In the 
following sections, we discuss the FBI’s strategies for hiding their identity as the sources 
of COINTELPRO’s external communication. The Bureau discussed multiple aspects of 
their external communication: the content of their messages, the materials used to construct 
print messages, and the distribution of those messages. As we explain, many memos ex-
plained how decisions about message content were influenced by efforts to conceal the FBI 
as the message source and the use of informants in intelligence gathering. However, the 
memos reveal even greater concern with how the materials used to create and distribute 
print materials would conceal the FBI’s involvement. See Table 1 for a list of concealment 
strategies. 
  
H O E R L  A N D  O R T I Z ,  M A N A G E M E N T  C O M M U N I C A T I O N  Q U A R T E R L Y  2 9  (2 0 1 5 )  
10 
Table 1. Typology of FBI Concealment Strategies 
Strategy type Strategy Example discussed in FBI memos 
Anonymous 
Message 
Content 
Use pseudonyms “The letter . . . would state . . . ‘Thought you might be 
amused by or have a use for these. Signed, a budding 
cartoonist.’” (Director to Chicago, July 31, 1969) 
Create elaborate backstories “First let me explain that I am a Negro and a Real Es-
tate Agent by profession. Most of my business is con-
cerned with the sale and leasing of farm land in the 
Knoxville, Tennessee area.” (Fictionalized letter sub-
mitted by New York for the Director’s approval, July 
17, 1970) 
Include jargon and factual errors “Unless we act now to contain these Apostles of Anar-
chy and Disciples of Destruction, our American White 
Christian Civilization is headed for certain doom.” 
(Proposed leaflet from St. Louis approved by the Di-
rector, July 29, 1969) 
Create unique messages “[E]ach letter must be original and worded to suit the 
particular organization to which it is being sent.” 
(WFO to Director, January 12, 1971) 
Rely on widely available 
    information 
“Information . . . being furnished to the subjects will 
not compromise any Jackson source as information has 
been made available to the Jackson Division through 
many sources.” (Jackson to Director, May 11, 1968) 
Anonymous 
Message 
Materials 
Use commercially available paper “The article should be . . . mailed in commercially pur-
chased envelopes.” (Director to San Francisco, January 
9, 1969) 
Use authentic stationery “This letter should be typed on a stationery most likely 
to be used by a member of the Yale University Alumni.” 
(Director to New Haven, August 25, 1969) 
Use authentic printing technology “[A] manually operated typewriter with a somewhat 
used ribbon should be utilized.” (Director to Cincinnati, 
March 29, 1971) 
Anonymous 
Delivery 
Techniques 
Mail materials from specific 
     locations 
“Authority is granted to New Haven for the prepara-
tion and mailing of an anonymous communication . . . 
The communication should be mailed from New Ha-
ven . . .” (Director to New Haven, August 25, 1969) 
Third parties must be trusted to 
     maintain FBI confidentiality 
“The person to whom this dissemination is made must 
be advised that the Bureau is not to be divulged as the 
source of this information.” (Director to New York, 
August 13, 1969) 
 
Repetition as an Internal Message Content Strategy 
Before we elaborate on the organization’s external message strategies, we pause to note 
that the formal structure of the memos foregrounds the value of organizational secrecy 
among FBI agents. In their initial proposals, agents routinely closed their memos with a 
sentence that confirmed that the action could not be “traced back to,” “compromise,” or “cause 
embarrassment to the Bureau.” The Director’s response would almost invariably confirm 
whether or not he agreed that the action could potentially expose the FBI or informants. 
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The high priority given to maintaining secrecy is highlighted in the Director’s notes at the 
end of every memo responding to a field agent’s request. These notes summarized the 
Director’s previous relevant correspondence with field offices and usually reiterated the 
field office’s insistence that proposed actions could not be traced back to the Bureau. For 
example, Detroit closed one proposal to send a letter under a pseudonym to local media 
with a typical remark, “the usual precautions will be taken to insure it cannot be traced 
back to the Bureau” (Detroit to Director, March 6, 1969). Although the Director’s letter ap-
proving Detroit’s proposal was only five sentences long, two of those sentences reiterated 
the value of maintaining the Bureau’s covert status. The second sentence reminded field 
agents to “take the usual precautions to insure this letter cannot be traced to the Bureau,” 
and the final sentence concluded, “There is no possibility of embarrassment to the Bureau” 
(Director to Detroit, March 25, 1969). 
The content surrounding references to the FBI’s covert status suggests that references to 
avoiding FBI exposure were not purely instrumental; frequently, SAC requests asserted 
that their actions could not be traced back to the FBI but did not offer additional explanation. 
SACs sometimes closed follow-up messages regarding previously approved actions with 
confirmation that those actions could not be traced back to the Bureau (Pittsburgh to Direc-
tor, June 15, 1970). Given the frequency of such remarks, the importance of hiding the FBI’s 
work could not have been newsworthy to the memos’ readers. From a rhetorical perspec-
tive, the routine references to maintaining secrecy might have more to do with establishing 
COINTELPRO’s identity as a secret operation than with sharing ideas or information (Burke, 
1969). The SACs’ regular assurances and the Director’s redundant reminders and confir-
mations that operations would safeguard COINTELPRO’s covert status conferred rela-
tional meaning about the identities and value of agents themselves. Reaffirmation and 
confirmation that outside individuals should not be able to trace COINTELPRO actions back 
to the Bureau served to solidify the value of secrecy and conferred special status among 
FBI agents as guardians of privileged information. 
 
Message Content Techniques Designed to Hide FBI Agents as Sources of Communication 
The Director’s strong preference for anonymous communication was rooted in his desire 
to keep Bureau techniques and the identities of informants secret from people outside of 
the agency. Messages were designed not only to hide the source’s identity but to also mis-
lead recipients by having the appearance of originating from someone outside of the FBI. 
The Bureau used a variety of techniques to direct recipients away from the FBI as the mes-
sage source. The most common technique was the construction of pseudonyms. Agents 
routinely sent counterfeit letters to members of targeted organizations suggesting that 
other members stole resources, were police or FBI informants, or had engaged in other 
forms of illicit behavior. (In many cases, the information contained in these letters was false.) 
The purpose of these letters was to spread distrust among members of Black political or-
ganizations. Signatures on these letters indicated the fictitious source’s vague affiliation 
with targeted activist organizations, such as “A friend of Sister Angela,” “A Concerned 
Brother” (Director to Chicago, November 3, 1970), and “A concerned sister” (Director to 
Detroit, September 15, 1969). Chicago agents created cartoons insinuating that the white 
antiwar organization Students for a Democratic Society was controlling the BPP, and sent 
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it to the Panthers with a note signed, “A budding cartoonist” (Director to Chicago, July 31, 
1969). 
In some instances, agents invented rationales and elaborate backstories explaining the 
necessity of anonymous communication. In an effort to discourage a foundation from giv-
ing a grant to SNCC, New York agents sent the foundation a letter from a fictional Black 
real estate developer. The letter explained that as a “good Christian,” the author was com-
pelled to report that SNCC intended to defraud them. The letter concluded, “I hope you 
understand that due to my occupation and position in my home town I cannot give you 
my name,” and was signed, “a friend” (New York to Director, July 17, 1970). 
Less frequently, agents deliberately misattributed their messages to known individuals. 
Agents used this strategy repeatedly in letters sent to Black Panther member Eldridge 
Cleaver. Because Cleaver was living in Algeria and had limited ability to contact members 
in the United States, agents reasoned that Cleaver was unlikely to follow up and confirm 
the identity of the letters’ authors. In a letter designed to foment distrust between BPP 
leader Huey Newton and his former Minister of Information Eldridge Cleaver, the San 
Francisco office drafted a letter disparaging Newton and signed it, “Big Man.” The refer-
ence to “Big Man” referred to another member of the BPP whose name was redacted from 
the files. Agents reasoned that if Cleaver did not believe the contents of the letter, it might 
mislead him to think that the undisclosed member was an FBI informant (Director to San 
Francisco, February 24, 1971; San Francisco to Director, February 22, 1971). A year earlier, 
San Francisco agents sent a letter to Cleaver insinuating that the author was Black Panther 
member Connie Matthews. The San Francisco SAC explained that “an entirely anonymous 
letter to Cleaver” would be “of little value” because previous anonymous sources were 
“branded as coming from the ‘pigs’” (San Francisco to Director, March 3, 1970). When mes-
sages misattributed authorship to actual individuals, agents took extra care to ensure that 
recipients could not trace the message back to law enforcement. Details about sources were 
left intentionally vague to avoid bringing suspicion toward the Bureau. In the rationale for 
sending the letter purportedly from Matthews, the San Francisco field office explained that 
the contents of the letter were “not sufficiently specific,” so that Cleaver might attribute it 
to other Panther members if Cleaver contacted Matthews, and she denied writing it (San 
Francisco to Director, March 3, 1970). 
For pseudonymous communication to be effective, the Director emphasized that all 
counterfeit written communication must look authentic. Fake signatures and language of 
the documents had to confirm the identity of the fictionalized source. The Director rea-
soned that, should recipients be suspicious of the legitimacy of the message source, it would 
compromise the entire operation. Thus, the Director denied San Francisco’s proposal to 
deliberately create a letter that Eldridge Cleaver would certainly recognize as fraudulent 
(Director to San Francisco, February 26, 1971; San Francisco to Director, February 24, 1971). 
The Director also denied Springfield’s proposal to write fake checks using a Panther check-
book obtained from a local police raid on the chapter’s headquarters. He explained that 
the fake signature on the check could “readily be ascertained” and possibly reveal that the 
Panthers were FBI targets (Director to Springfield, February 24, 1971). 
One technique to lend authenticity to counterfeit messages was to include “jargon,” in-
tentional errors, and factual inaccuracies in pseudonymous flyers and letters (Director to 
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Savannah, December 12, 1969; Director to Hong Kong, August 22, 1968; Charlotte to Di-
rector, October 26, 1970). In an effort to create friction between The Black Liberators and a 
less militant Black organization, The Zulu 1200s, the St. Louis field office designed a flyer 
disparaging the Zulus. Agents explained that the flyer’s “tenor and vocabulary were care-
fully chosen to give the impression that it was written by . . . local black militants.” They 
added that “intentional errors of typing and spelling in the flyers were inserted to add to 
its ‘authenticity’” (St. Louis to Director, October 29, 1968). The St. Louis field office pro-
posed a similar strategy the following year in an effort to create friction between White 
and Black militants in the area. Agents created a flyer with the title “Storm Warnings” to 
generate the impression it was written by local right-wing extremists. A memo to the Di-
rector explained that the flyer was “sprinkled with factual inaccuracies and exaggerations 
in order to carry out the theme as a typical ‘right-winger’ might write it and also to elimi-
nate any suspicion that any official investigation agency assisted in the preparation” (St. 
Louis to Director, July 11, 1969). The first page of the second issue of Storm Warnings an-
nounced that the flyer revealed the identities of local “Communist Functionaries, Black 
Extremists, and Student Agitators.” It also warned readers that “[u]nless we act now to 
contain these Apostles of Anarchy and Disciples of Destruction, our American White 
Christian Civilization is headed for certain doom.” The Director commended the agents 
for their efforts, and tentatively approved the request on condition that the office specifi-
cally identify the flyer’s intended recipients (Director to St. Louis, July 29, 1969). 
Another technique to construct the authenticity of anonymous messages was to create 
each message separately. Messages intended for different recipients by purportedly differ-
ent fictitious or pseudonymous authors had to be unique and no passages could be taken 
verbatim from previously written letters. This technique is highlighted in an action that 
involved mailing letters with similar messages to universities across the country. Each let-
ter was purportedly from a pseudonymous source that attended a university on the oppo-
site coast. The Washington state SAC cautioned that “[t]o be effective, each letter must be 
original and worded to suit the particular organization to which it is being sent” (WFO to 
Director, January 12, 1971). 
Agents also strategized to conceal the identity of informants from message recipients. 
One approach was to describe targeted groups’ activities and events in vague language 
that many members of the organization might have used. In one heavily redacted memo, 
the New Haven SAC explained that agents avoided using exact terminology in their pro-
posed message to avoid revealing the source (New Haven to Director, November 12, 1969). 
Agents strove to strike a delicate balance between providing enough information to au-
thenticate messages with sufficient vagueness to prevent informants from being identified. 
They also endeavored to maintain positive relationships with news sources. For both of 
these reasons, the Director often required that information contained in anonymous mes-
sages be available from multiple sources beyond the informants (New York to Director, 
March 26, 1969; Memphis to Director, 2/26/1969). Responding to Boston’s request to deliver 
information about Stokely Carmichael to a cooperative news source, the Director insisted 
that “the Bureau must be able to determine if the information is public knowledge so that 
sources would not be exposed” (Director to Boston, February 8, 1968). In a proposal to send 
three pseudonymous letters to SNCC members in Atlanta, the Jackson office confirmed 
H O E R L  A N D  O R T I Z ,  M A N A G E M E N T  C O M M U N I C A T I O N  Q U A R T E R L Y  2 9  (2 0 1 5 )  
14 
that the letters would not “compromise any Jackson source as information has been made 
available to the Jackson Division through many sources” (Jackson to Director, May 11, 
1968). 
 
Message Materials Selected to Hide FBI Agents as Sources of Communication 
In addition to creating message content that would mislead recipients about the message 
source, the Bureau put great care and detail into ensuring that the materials involved in 
creating and delivering anonymous print communication could not be traced to the Bu-
reau. Memos suggest that the Director scrutinized the material construction and distribu-
tion of messages closely. Many memos describe plans for gathering printing materials in 
far more detail than they explain the message content itself. The Director gave field agents 
specific instructions in this regard; paper products had to be available in the area from 
where the purported source of information lived, and stationery and envelopes had to be 
“unwatermarked” and purchased commercially (Director to San Francisco, January 9, 1969). 
When agents did not state their intention to purchase materials commercially, the Director 
would remind them to do so (Director to San Francisco, November 14, 1968; Director to 
New York, January 28, 1971). 
Forged letters written under the names of actual individuals and organizations had to 
be written on their official stationery (Director to San Francisco, March 25, 1971). For in-
stance, New Haven proposed to write an anonymous letter purportedly from a “disgusted 
member of the Yale University Alumni” to discourage university officials from allowing 
BPP member Bobby Seale from speaking on the campus. The Director approved this re-
quest on the condition that the letter “be typed on a stationery most likely to be used by a 
member” of the alumni (Director to New Haven, August 25, 1969). In a different case, the 
Director tentatively approved San Francisco’s proposal to mail fake expulsion letters to 
members of the BPP, but the Director later rescinded this approval after San Francisco con-
cluded that they could not access actual BPP letterhead (Director to San Francisco, January 
19, 1970). 
The Director also required agents to specify how the use of printing technology would 
disguise the FBI’s role as the message source. FBI agents did not use the Bureau’s own 
Xerox machines if similar machines were not available in the area, and typewriters had to 
appear to belong to the fictitious author. For example, the Director approved the creation 
of a fictitious letter from Hong Kong on condition that the typewriter used be available in 
that region (Director to Hong Kong, August 22, 1968). In a separate instance, he authorized 
that a fictitious letter purportedly from an impoverished Ohio Black Panther be sent to BPP 
headquarters provided that the agents use “a manually operated typewriter with a some-
what used ribbon” (Director to Cincinnati, March 29, 1971). 
 
Message Delivery Techniques Designed to Hide FBI Agents as Sources of Communication 
In addition to ensuring that printing materials could not be traced back to the Bureau, 
agents devised specific plans to covertly deliver messages. Letters from pseudonymous or 
misattributed sources were mailed from the locations they were purported to originate 
from (Director to New Haven, August 25, 1969; Moore to Sullivan, March 4, 1970). This 
often required that the Director coordinate actions between field offices, as agents from 
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one office would create a letter and send it to a different field office for mailing (Director 
to SACs, Los Angeles, San Francisco, WFO, January 19, 1970; New York to Director, July 
29, 1970). Just as the Director instructed agents not to use verbatim passages in materials 
sent to different audiences, he advised agents to diversify their mailing techniques. For 
example, San Francisco received approval to mail copies of two articles to local colleges. 
One article was written by Roy Wilkins, the head of the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People (NAACP), and the other was written by Carl Rowan, a news-
paper columnist. The Director advised agents to mail the articles separately to different 
schools “to lessen the possibility of this action appearing to be an organized campaign” 
(Director to San Francisco, February 27, 1969). 
A request submitted by the Washington state field office illustrates the consideration 
agents put into planning the materials and distribution of counterfeit messages. Agents 
proposed to create a letter and attribute authorship to Stokely Carmichael, who was living 
in Guinea at the time. The letter, written ostensibly for a friend of Carmichael’s, insinuated 
that Carmichael planned to harm another member of the Pan African Movement. The agents 
strategized to create a plausible scenario in which this supposedly endangered individual 
might “accidentally” receive the forged letter. Agents decided it would be most convincing 
if the letter stated that it was smuggled out of Guinea to be mailed from France. Washing-
ton agents would create the text of the letter and mail it to their Paris contact. Thereafter, 
the Paris contact would be required to obtain “appropriate type stationery commonly used 
in Conakry, Guinea, and prepare the letter in English on a French style typewriter. The 
letter should then be mailed from Orly Airport to New York City.” To create a plausible 
address for the purported source of the message, New York agents would then rent a post 
office box for a 30-day period under the name of an actual or fictitious friend of Carmichael. 
The Washington field office then explained how the letter might be constructed to appear 
as though someone found the letter and decided to send it to the person being threatened. 
 
Once the letter is recovered in New York it should be opened and then placed 
together with the envelope showing cancellation in Paris, France into another 
envelope with an anonymous cover letter stating the letter was found on the 
street. 
 
The agents added that “[t]o make the letter look even more authentic, it could also be 
stepped on several times to give the appearance of having been trampled on” (WFO to 
Director, March 19, 1971). Although this proposal is one of the more elaborate requests 
sent to the Director, it represents the specificity and detail by which agents demonstrated 
that their communication could not be traced back to the Bureau. 
As we note earlier, the Director strongly preferred anonymous print communication to 
avoid involving third parties in their actions. However, there were instances in which the 
Director allowed agents to deliver communication to third parties for broader distribution. 
In most of these instances, the Bureau sought to raise public awareness of the danger that 
Black activism posed to their communities. In memos requesting and approving the use of 
third parties, agents and the Director confirmed that the third party individual understood 
that communication from the FBI was confidential. In one case, Hoover approved the New 
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York field office’s proposal to disseminate public source items about the BPP to the Roman 
Catholic Archdiocese of New York via one of three church Monsignors. The Director re-
minded New York agents that “the person to whom this dissemination is made must be 
advised that the Bureau is not to be divulged as the source of this information” (Director 
to New York, August 13, 1969). In another example, the Director gave Miami agents the 
authority to work with a local news producer to create a documentary critical of the NOI. 
The Director’s memo included specific instructions about what information should be in-
cluded in the documentary and instructed agents to remind the source that “bureau coop-
eration with him is strictly on a confidential basis” (Director to Miami, February 5, 1969). 
The Director’s willingness to deliver messages through a few select third parties suggests 
that COINTELPRO was not a completely shadowed campaign; however, it does suggest 
that COINTELPRO was a closely guarded secret. Only individuals with a proven record 
of keeping other FBI secrets and sharing the Director’s ideological perspective were trusted 
with information about the Bureau’s techniques for disrupting radical Black political or-
ganizing. 
 
Discussion 
 
The COINTELPRO memos reveal a variety of strategies designed to hide the FBI’s identity 
from recipients of the program’s external communication. These strategies highlight the 
value that FBI placed on maintaining their shadowed position. They also elucidate the high 
degree of coordination required for members to develop collective strategies for keeping 
secrets from people outside the organization. Rank and file members of the organization 
routinely deferred to the authority of their supervisors; they provided detailed information 
about the planning and preparation of external messages to convince the supervisor that 
secrecy has been thoroughly accounted for; and they sought to ensure secrecy in every 
stage of their planning process. Organizational members and supervisors had to agree, not 
only about the content of their messages to external recipients, but about the mechanisms 
and platforms for delivering those messages. Ultimately, the COINTELPRO memos sug-
gest that the FBI’s collective identity as an organization was rooted in a constant concern 
for hiding aspects of that identity to others outside of the organization. 
Our study points to several practical and ethical considerations for decisions about or-
ganizational secrecy. From a practical standpoint, the analysis of the copious memos exchanged 
between FBI offices provides insight into the laborious nature of secret communication. 
The Director’s close attention to message content, materials, and delivery highlights the 
time and resources involved in keeping the FBI’s efforts a secret from individuals outside 
of the organization. Popular culture including the recent Hollywood film The Imitation 
Game frequently frames the work of secretive organizations as lively and exhilarating. 
Grey’s (2014) account of Great Britain’s deciphering program at Bletchey Park during World 
War II, the inspiration for The Imitation Game, provides an intriguing historical narrative of 
its organizational culture, which was famous for its secret keeping exploits. By contrast, 
this study reveals that maintaining organizational secrets is often tedious and boring. The 
routine communication involved in maintaining the FBI’s covert status was monotonous 
work. Although any organization must expand energy and resources to keep information 
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a secret, the amount of energy required to maintain secrecy is compounded when an entire 
organization or program must remain hidden. 
The variety of strategies that agents discussed with the Director suggests that organiza-
tion members may be required to devote considerable effort and resources in developing 
external messages particularly when that communication is intended to deceive others. FBI 
agents went to great lengths to make pseudonymous letters and leaflets appear authentic. 
Their memos draw attention to the nuanced (albeit troubling) practices of constructing 
pseudonymous messages. The types of strategies that FBI agents developed suggests that 
deceptive communicators must closely attend to the ways in which message content, plat-
forms, and delivery confirm the existence of the fictional identities. Thus, keeping the iden-
tities of communicators hidden can be a creative yet time-consuming enterprise. 
Another consideration is that secrecy may jeopardize the survival of an organization. 
Cunningham (2004) contends that the negative publicity that followed from the public rev-
elation of COINTELPRO caused “irreparable harm to the Bureau’s carefully cultivated 
public image” (p. 36). To this day, many nonviolent activist groups avoid speaking with 
FBI agents due to their distrust of the organization. Thus, COINTELPRO jeopardized the 
agency’s ability to engage in their legitimate and overt operations. In this regard, our study 
revealed an interesting secrecy paradox. Although secrecy may be necessary for organiza-
tion members to achieve their goals, it may also become the reason for an organization’s 
failure. This aspect of secrecy underscores the inherent susceptibilities of secrecy regarding 
counterintelligence activities within terrorist groups; no group can actually achieve perfect 
secrecy while functioning effectively, and every new advantage attained by groups also 
produces new vulnerabilities (Mobley, 2012). Secrecy is, thus, “discursively powerful, [has] 
wide-ranging effects on bureaucratic practice and regularly fail[s]” (Fenster, 2015, p. 163). 
In addition to these practical considerations, this study highlights several ethical dilem-
mas of secret organizing, particularly for clandestine organizations that seek to avoid ac-
countability. If, as Simmel (1906) notes, secrets are the basis of social relationships, our 
article points to the need to distinguish between types of secrets based on the specific pur-
poses that those secrets serve. Secrecy to avoid accountability can have particularly dam-
aging implications for individuals, organization members, and the public. Although secrets 
shape perceptions of reality (Keane, 2008), messages designed to maintain secrecy may be 
purposefully misleading and intended to harm others. This observation has additional im-
plications for scholars interested in the symbolic dimensions of anonymous and pseudon-
ymous communication. To understand the social and political consequences of messages 
with vague or unstated authorship, researchers should consider the institutional influ-
ences and motivations for these messages. Even when it is difficult to ascertain who has 
created a particular message, it is important to consider whose interests are being served 
by its circulation. 
One lesson from the COINTELPRO era of the FBI is that hidden organizing and pseu-
donymous communication may enable government organizations to subvert the demo-
cratic process. Recent scholarship has critiqued reductive treatments of transparency for 
assuming that full disclosure of organizational practices will necessarily lead to more dem-
ocratic communication and processes (Christensen & Cheney, 2015; Fenster, 2015). Although 
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transparency is presumed to generate accountability, there is no guarantee that it will. Fur-
thermore, there are circumstances in which secrecy is needed to preserve the rights and 
well-being of individuals within an organization. However, this study highlights the con-
tinuing importance of transparency as a principle for organizations charged with protect-
ing the public. 
Had these memos never been released to the public, we might conclude that radical 
Black organizations fell into decline in the early to mid-1970s through the process of dem-
ocratic decision-making. We would not know the FBI launched a concerted propaganda 
campaign designed to prevent these organizations from operating effectively. Nor would 
we know that much of the FBI’s information about radical Black organizations was false. 
Although secrecy expands counterintelligence organizations’ ability to act efficiently, it 
also prevents public officials and citizens from evaluating the justness of law enforcement 
operations. 
Under Hoover’s FBI, secrecy was the foundation for a culture of impunity. The Director 
encouraged agents to lie about the activities of targets and approved several actions inten-
tionally designed to cause mental distress and physical injury of targeted individuals, their 
friends, and their associates. In some of the most egregious examples, Hoover continued 
to authorize San Diego’s dissemination of fabricated documents to the Panthers and US 
organizations even after they contributed to the ongoing shootouts between the two 
groups (O’Reilly, 1989). On December 4, 1969, the Chicago police killed BPP leaders Fred 
Hampton and Mark Clark. Police had access to Hampton’s bedroom because the FBI shared 
information with police that they gathered from secret informant William O’Neal (Haas, 
2010). By enabling law enforcement agencies to operate without external oversight or au-
thorization, secrecy can facilitate reprehensible behavior. 
 
Future Directions 
 
Future research might build upon communication approaches to organizational secrecy in 
a variety of directions. One avenue of research might explore how members resist organi-
zational secrecy. Such research might provide information about the communication prac-
tices of dissident members of hidden organizations, and explain how that dissent interacts 
with broader decision-making within the organization. Future research might also con-
sider how the emergence of electronic media might influence the decision-making pro-
cesses for keeping secrets within hidden organizations. The FBI’s internal memos were 
circulated in print via teletype; much of their discussion revolved around the use of print 
communication. Thus, members of current hidden organizations must develop strategies 
geared toward maintaining anonymity among external recipients who might already be 
suspicious of printed material. 
Further research might also explore how government intelligence organizations and ac-
tivist movements have adapted their communication in recent decades. Since COINTELPRO’s 
exposure, the public has expressed deep suspicion toward government secrecy and sur-
veillance. WikiLeaks documents reveal that the Department of Homeland Security secretly 
monitored the Occupy Wall Street movement. In rhetoric eerily reminiscent of Hoover’s, 
the department warned of the movement’s “increased potential for violence” despite its 
H O E R L  A N D  O R T I Z ,  M A N A G E M E N T  C O M M U N I C A T I O N  Q U A R T E R L Y  2 9  (2 0 1 5 )  
19 
“peaceful nature” (Hastings, 2012). It would be challenging but interesting to learn how 
social movement organizations adjust their messages given their awareness of the govern-
ment’s history of secret surveillance. Responding to revelations about the National Secu-
rity Agency’s secret collection of Americans’ phone records, civic groups and political 
leaders have increasingly criticized government agencies’ covert operations. Additional 
research could shed light on how government agencies have revised and legitimized their 
uses of secrecy. Given the stakes for organization members and the public, organizational 
secrecy merits further scrutiny and research. As our technological capacities for secrecy 
have grown with the rise of digital media, this line of research will continue to have prac-
tical and scholarly implications for organizations and democracy. 
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Notes 
1. The Smith Act, otherwise known as the Alien Registration Act of 1940, criminalized communica-
tion advocating the overthrow of the U.S. government and required all noncitizen adults to reg-
ister with the government. 
2. Throughout our analysis, citations from “the Director” reflect the language of the memos. Pre-
sumably, Hoover was the author of messages sent under the Director’s title, but his assistant 
directors may also have authored memos under this title. We sometimes refer to the Director as 
“he” given that no women were hired as Bureau agents when COINTELPRO was active. 
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